

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS		✓		
5	DDI		✓		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt	DDI	FW	ES 7/18/84	
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS		✓		
19	C/ALIS		✓		
20	NIO/SP		✓		
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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks


 Executive Secretary

 7/16/84
 Date

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Executive Registry

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Geneva, Switzerland

July 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

FROM: E. Rowny (E)

SUBJECT: Strategy for the Talks in Vienna

The following memo provides some thoughts, from my perspective as START negotiator, on how to proceed in planning for the talks in Vienna. These thoughts are not a substitute for the IG study plan. Rather, they might be used as "strawmen" for the study plan.

Soviet Objectives

In offering negotiations "to prevent the militarization of outer space," the Soviets sought to achieve several objectives.

First, the Soviets are greatly concerned that the US will use its technological edge to leap-frog ahead in space weapons. My Soviet counterpart, Viktor Karpov, has often signaled to me that the Soviets recognize the US advantage in advanced technology. They hoped to strengthen Congressional pressure for a moratorium on US ASAT tests and, even more importantly in the long run, to derail SDI. Soviet willingness to begin negotiations before the election, even though it might help the Administration politically, is evidence of their concern.

Second, the Soviets hoped to put us on the defensive by capitalizing on support in Europe and this country for negotiations on space weaponry and the perception of US unwillingness to engage in such talks.

Third, the Soviets hoped that the offer to begin ASAT talks would divert public attention away from their unwillingness to resume START and INF.

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From the Soviet point of view, it must have looked like a no-lose proposition: If we accepted, the Soviets would have gained one of their major objectives. If we refused, the Soviets could use our refusal to portray the US as unwilling to pursue arms control seriously.

The Soviets were surprised by the speed and character of the US response. The July 1 Tass statement issued in response to our acceptance reads as if it had been originally drafted to counter a totally negative US response. The remarks on US "conditions" appear to have been tacked on as something of an afterthought. The tone of the July 6 Tass statement is more moderate, but it goes even farther in attempting to establish a Soviet precondition for the talks, that is, US agreement to discuss only space issues in Vienna. It does not rule out preliminary diplomatic discussions on the scope of the talks and its call for an agreed agenda may reflect Soviet willingness to negotiate further on this issue.

As we pursue this matter, we should have three objectives:

First, we should stress to the public and the Soviets that we have no preconditions. At the same time, we should make it clear that we cannot accept Soviet preconditions aimed at restricting our right to raise issues of concern to us.

Second, we should ensure that if the Vienna talks do not occur, the onus falls on the Soviets because of their effort to impose preconditions.

Third, we should recognize that the Soviet concern over US space weapons gives us an element of exploitable leverage.

Scope

The first policy issue we need to decide is our objective for the Vienna talks and a broad strategy to accomplish that objective.

I believe that while we should be prepared to have the primary focus of the discussions in Vienna be on ASAT, we should also use the discussions in Vienna and our diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets before Vienna to advance the resumption of START and INF. We should stress that resumption of the START and INF negotiations could lead to a mutually acceptable agreement in the interest of both nations.

Once we have decided on the preferred approach, we should prepare a set of guidelines for the head of the Vienna delegation. I believe it would be in our interest to agree with the Soviets in advance that the initial round of the Vienna discussions should last no more than one month or six weeks. It is usually to our advantage to set a terminal date in advance; it helps smoke out

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the Soviet objectives and could preclude Soviet stalling. We should hold off on deciding whether to schedule a second round until we see how the discussions progress in Vienna.

Substantive Approaches to START in Vienna

At this point, we do not know what will be the final result of our discussions with the Soviets on an agenda for Vienna. Nevertheless, it is important for us to begin now to think through the substantive objectives we hope to accomplish in Vienna with respect to START.

As has been the case with most US-Soviet arms control negotiations, the initial round in Vienna will probably be exploratory. Realistically, we cannot expect the Soviets to go very far in discussing START or INF in Vienna. From my point of view, our primary objective in Vienna with respect to START should be to lay the groundwork for resumption of negotiations in early 1985. To do this, however, our discussions on START in Vienna will need to be more than simply procedural. We should be in a position to put forward substantive ideas on START, including the trade-offs that President Reagan and I have said the US is prepared to explore. We need to be able to substantiate what we have repeatedly told the Soviets in our private diplomatic exchanges, and what we have also said in public, that we have a number of specific ideas on how to make progress in START once the negotiations resume. However, we should make it clear to the Soviets that we do not intend to pursue substantive negotiations on START in Vienna and that the proper forum for such substantive negotiations on START is in Geneva. During our diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets prior to Vienna, we should discuss START and INF resumption only in the most general terms to avoid giving them an excuse for refusing to come to Geneva.

In view of the above, it will be important to meet the August 1 deadline established in NSDD 142 for START work. Once this work is accomplished, we should be prepared to translate it into specific trade-off approaches which we can discuss with the Soviets in Vienna.

We should also be open-minded and responsive to Soviet ideas on how their concerns on INF systems can be accommodated. We should recognize that there can be no START accord without a resolution of the INF issues which assures NATO security and which is also acceptable to the Soviets.

Composition of the Delegation

The announcement of the head of the delegation to Vienna and the composition of the delegation itself will be a major message we send to the Soviets and the world at large about our objectives in Vienna. Ideally, the chairman of the delegation should be

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someone with a broad political background. He should have practical experience in dealing with the Soviets. He or his deputy should also have experience in space matters. In order to retain the substantive focus of the talks on ASAT, we should avoid appointing someone whose background could lead him to be seen as a kind of super-negotiator on all arms control issues, or one who was overly identified with strategic arms negotiations. We should avoid making this appointment too soon; perhaps early September would be the correct timing.

In view of Soviet reluctance to discuss START or INF in Vienna, appointing Paul Nitze or me to head the US delegation risks a Soviet no-show. Moreover, both of us will need to be free to devote our full efforts to START and INF should the talks resume, as I expect they will. Nevertheless, I believe there should be one person from each of our delegations attached to the Vienna delegation to provide expertise on START and INF.

Public Diplomacy

We will also need to develop a public affairs strategy. In the period before the Vienna discussions, our basic tactic should be not to take "nyet" for an answer. We should not discuss in public the status of our diplomatic efforts with the Soviets to arrange the talks. In our public statements, we should stress that we have no preconditions, that we are planning to be in Vienna in September, and that we hope the Soviets will be there also. We should point out that we have a number of concerns which we will be prepared to discuss, including ASAT and resumption of START and INF. Further, that we will be prepared to consider and respond constructively to any Soviet concerns. It might also be helpful to remind the public that there have been many previous instances of East-West talks beginning before the parties had completely agreed on the scope of the discussions, such as INF, CSCE, and SALT I.

Copies:

Mr. Weinberger
Mr. Dam
Gen. Vessey
Mr. Casey
Amb. Adelman
Mr. Emery
Amb. Nitze

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